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‘Unemployment develops….because people want the moon – men cannot be 
employed when the object of desire (i.e. money) is something which cannot be 
readily produced and the demand for which cannot be readily choked off’ (Keynes, 
1936, p. 235). 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Keynes’s theory of a monetary economy and his liquidity preference theory of 
investment will be examined in order to highlight the essential properties of money 
under the conditions of uncertainty, which inevitably prefigures the existence of 
involuntary unemployment and could – within a laissez faire, deregulated financial 
system – induce phases of endemic financial instability and crises.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
A modern capitalist monetary economy is inherently unstable. One of the most insightful 
contributions to our understanding of the essential non-ergodic characteristics of a monetary 
economy is the original Keynesian theory of money under the conditions of radical 
uncertainty. Keynes’s theory of money reveals how the problem of involuntary 
unemployment is inextricably bound up in the liquidity preferences by wealth-holders. 
Unfortunately, these original insights have been eclipsed by the neoclassical reinstatement of 
Say’s law and its more recent incarnations in the guise of rational expectations and the 
efficient markets hypothesis. It will be argued that Keynes’s critique of his ‘classical’ 
contemporaries over the problem of uncertainty acquires even greater resonance in relation 
to their modern progenies: ‘I accuse the classical economic theory of being itself one of 
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those pretty, polite techniques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the 
fact that we know very little about the future’ (Keynes, 1937b, p. 115).  
 
A MONETARY THEORY OF PRODUCTION 
 
In the General Theory, Keynes argued that there is a fundamental distinction between the 
system of barter and a modern monetary economy. Whereas barter can only take place in a 
bilateral set of social relations, a monetary economy is essentially governed by the use of an 
abstract money of account, which is characterised by a whole chain of debtors and creditors 
in a complex decentralised market (Ingham, 2001, p.309). This view challenges the orthodox 
theory that money is a ‘veil over barter’ and that what distinguishes a pure barter economy 
from a monetary economy is the simple fact that money is used as a means of exchange 
between commodities to derive a price based on their respective exchange ratios. In this 
traditional perspective, money emerges historically and spontaneously to perform the role of 
medium of exchange in order to facilitate trade and as such, has neutral effects on the ‘real’ 
economy (Sardoni, 1987, p.71). Doubtless, this pure commodity economy, or what Keynes 
describes as a ‘real exchange economy’, bears very little relation to a sophisticated monetary 
economy.  
 
The conditions necessary for the ‘neutrality’ of money abstract entirely from the possibility 
of crises. The neutrality of money tends to correspond with a real exchange economy, or in 
Marxian terminology, to a pure commodity economy in which use-value determines the 
exchange of commodities, represented by the formula C-M-C’ (Rotheim, 1981, p.576). 
Under these idealised conditions, Say’s law of the market will be validated. In a monetary 
economy, however, the sole aim of production is to realise profits in its money form, 
represented by the formula M-C-M’. It was from this seminal insight that Keynes developed 
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his monetary theory of production (Keynes, 1933). This insight was to transform the very 
logic of the classical postulates of the market and overthrow the dogma of Say’s law.  
 
Now the conditions required for the ‘neutrality’ of money….are, I suspect precisely 
the same as those will insure that crises do not occur. If this is true, the real exchange 
economies….though a valuable abstraction in itself and perfectly valid as an 
intellectual conception, is a singularly blunt weapon for dealing with the problem of 
booms and depressions. For it has assumed away the very matter under 
investigation….This is not the same thing as to say that the problem of booms and 
depressions is a purely monetary problem….I am saying that booms and depressions 
are phenomena peculiar to an economy in which – in some significant sense which I 
am not attempting to define precisely in this place – money is not neutral (Keynes, 
1933, p.410-11). 
 
Keynes (1930) contends that the evolution of fiat money transformed the economic system 
from a real exchange economy to a monetary economy. In a monetary economy, the object is 
not the immediate satisfaction of social needs (or use-values) but the desire to accumulate 
wealth in the form of money. As Marx quite perceptively understood, capitalism is governed 
by the realisation of exchange-values into their monetary equivalent (Dillard, 1984, p.423). 
In other words, entrepreneurs will invest on the expectation of increasing their monetary 
wealth. The evolution of chartalist forms of money was a necessary development in the 
denomination of market prices in a specific fiat money, or the official state money of account 
(Wray, 2006, p.215). Unlike the classical theory, which was informed by a real exchange 
economy in which commodity money predominates, fiat money is not a commodity and 
cannot be produced by labour. The imposition of fiat money transforms the very nature of 
exchange since purchasing power is not determined by simple commodity exchange but by 
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the acquisition of money.1
 
 The banking institutions which issue money enjoy the privileges 
of intrinsic purchasing power as long as the unit of account is validated by the state. The 
state and the central bank are thus inscribed with a monopoly over the purchasing power of 
fiat money (Bertocco, 2005, p.490).  
In a real exchange economy, Say’s law applies because money income is ultimately spent, 
either directly or indirectly, in order to realise use-values. But in a monetary economy, this 
simple postulate no longer applies. The essential properties of fiat money are characterised 
by: (1) zero elasticity and (2) zero elasticity of substitution between liquid assets and 
commodities. In the former, fiat money, unlike commodity money, cannot be produced on 
the basis of labour values. In the latter, Keynes (1936) argues that an increase in the demand 
for money does not lead to the substitution of fiat money for other forms of commodity 
money or other liquid assets. It follows that under a regime of fiat money, an increase in the 
demand for money might lead to a fall in effective demand. Since fiat money possesses no 
                                                 
1 The Cambridge equation of the value of money was formulated to provide an alternative theory to 
the quantity theories of money and to reflect changes in the purchasing power of money as a result of 
changes in supply and demand. To quote from Joan Robinson: 
‘The apparatus used to analyse the determination of the price level were tautological statements 
known as Quantity Equations. The ‘Cambridge’ equation was consciously designed to deal with the 
value of money in terms of supply and demand. In its simplest form the Cambridge equation was as 
follows: 
Π = kR/M 
Where Π is the purchasing power of money, R the real national income, k the proportion of real 
income held in the form of money (cash, bank balances), and M the quantity of money. kR then 
represents the demand for money in terms of real wealth, and M the supply of money. The equation 
leads naturally to the simple argument that the greater the supply of money (M) the smaller its value 
(Π), and the greater the demand for money (kR) the greater is its value’ (Robinson, 1933, p. 23). 
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real intrinsic value, fluctuations in aggregate demand depend upon the willingness of 
economic agents to employ fiat money to generate spending. The presence of fiat money in a 
monetary economy means that the existence of involuntary unemployment is always possible 
(Bertocco, 2007, p.104). The paradox of investment implies that an increase in the demand 
for money causes a relative diminution in aggregate demand because of the presence of 
uncertainty. The decision to invest by entrepreneurs determines aggregate demand but if 
saving exceeds investment as a result of a shift in liquidity preferences, the level of 
aggregate demand might not be sufficient to absorb aggregate output. This represents the 
ostensible ‘paradox of thrift’. A crisis of relative over-production ensues.  
 
The evolution of credit implies that banks act as the receptacles by which credit-money is 
created. In this critical sense, the unit of account functions of money tend to supersede its 
function as a means of circulation. With the existence of forward contracts, money acquires 
the characteristics of a debt issued to transfer purchasing power from the future to the 
present. Fiat money is assigned the highest liquidity premium of which high-powered central 
bank money constitutes the most liquid type. Endogenous theories of money merely state 
that an increase in the demand for money is automatically met by an expansion of credit 
through an increase in bank liabilities. Rising liquidity preferences, however, act in the 
opposite direction in which economic agents desire to shift their portfolio preferences from 
relatively illiquid assets into more liquid assets. Bank liabilities therefore act as a store of 
value. An increase in liquidity preferences thus corresponds to the destruction of credit 
money as economic agents curtail their expenditure and engage in the liquidation of assets 
(Wray, 1992, p. 303). Conversely, an increase in the demand for money implies a 
willingness by banks to expand the creation of credit.  
 
The existence of contracts, which have to be converted into their money form, is an essential 
characteristic of modern capitalist money conceived as an abstract unit of account. Since 
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production occurs over a relatively long time horizon, transactions are premised on future 
expectations, which involve forward contracts (Davidson, 1978, p.57-58). The concept of a 
‘monetary constraint’ compels economic agents to respect their contracts and to validate 
their debt obligations. In the absence of these contractual obligations, the market system 
would inevitably break down. Indeed, it is precisely during financial crises that this 
institutional web of contractual networks encounters severe stress as the chain of payments is 
interrupted through a series of cascading defaults and bankruptcies. These payments 
contracts are mediated by the banking system. Private banknotes are nothing more than a 
mechanism of ‘clearing’ private debts. To be sure, these new forms of money are not merely 
forms of deferred payment but constitute intricate types of ‘credit money’ issued by private 
banks, which circulate as means of payments. As long as private banknotes are backed by a 
system of central bank reserves, which regulate their circulation as high-powered money, the 
whole system of credit money becomes a regime of negotiable debt issued as means of 
payments. These forms of ‘depersonalised’ debt constitute specifically capitalist money. As 
Davidson has quite cogently argued:  
 
Bank money is, of course, simply evidence of a private debt contract, but the 
discovery of the efficiency of ‘clearing’, that is the realisation that some forms of 
private debt can be used in settlement of the overlapping myriad of private contracts 
immensely increased the efficiency of the monetary system. Three conditions are 
necessary in order for such a private debt to operate as a medium of exchange: (1) the 
private debt must be denominated in terms of the monetary unit, (2) a clearing 
institution for these private debts must be developed; and (3) assurances that uncleared 
debts are convertible at a known parity into the legally enforceable medium of 
exchange (Davidson, 1972, pp.151-52). 
 
In the Treatise on Money (1930), Keynes's theory of money assimilates some of the 
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chartalist conceptions developed by Knapp (1924). Quite contrary to the prevailing 
Monetarist and exogenous theories of money, modern economies are characterised by the 
pre-eminence of chartalist forms of money. The government ultimately defines the nature of 
money by choosing the monetary unit that it will accept in the payment of taxes. 
Consequently, the issuing of fiat money implies that in order to pay taxes, economic agents 
need to acquire money. A monetary circuit is set in motion in which the money issued by the 
government presupposes that it is bestowed with the privileges of seigniorage: ‘As a 
monopoly supplier of the currency, the government can set the price of those things it is 
willing to buy since this is the only source of the currency needed by the public to pay taxes’ 
(Wray, 1998, p.7). But taxes can only be levied in the future insofar as the initial 
expenditures of firms and the state constitute the monetary circuit by which the final 
payment of taxes is realised. The central bank therefore creates credit by issuing debts onto 
itself in order to activate the spending of the government. The causation runs from the 
issuing of sovereign debt which then allows governments to specify the amount of debts that 
the state needs to collect through taxation. This, in turn, will liquidate the debt obligations 
incurred by the state (or the Treasury) to the central bank (Parguez and Seccarella, 2000, 
p.111). Tax revenue simultaneously cancels the central bank debt which has been issued in 
the original monetary circuit. In the chartalist conception, money is the ultimate creature of 
the state. ‘From this perspective, money is predominantly state money and the liabilities of 
the state central banks, for example, acquire the status of valuata or base money because of 
the coercive power of the state and, in particular, because of its ability to levy taxes on its 
citizens payable in its own currency’ (Smithin, 2003, p.26). 
 
Government spending is therefore financed through the creation of fiat money, rather than 
through tax revenues or the issuing of bonds. In this context, bond sales are simply a means 
by which excess reserves are sterilised in order to ensure a positive rate of interest in the 
central bank overnight or prime rate. Bond sales are rarely used to finance government 
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deficits, except in very exceptional cases of war and other crises. It follows that a balanced 
budget over the economic cycle represents the theoretical minimum that governments should 
aim to aspire. Indeed, there is a very sound argument, based upon the tenets of functional 
finance, that moderate budget deficits are required to maintain the issuing of government 
bonds and by so doing, provide the very rationale for the existence of a bond market. 
‘Budget deficits do not require 'borrowing' by the government (bond sales); rather, the 
government provides bonds to allow the public to hold interest-bearing alternatives to non-
interest-bearing government money’ (Wray, 1998, p.19). At the same time, since commercial 
bank debts are convertible into fiat money, commercial banks are able to acquire central 
bank liabilities. Thus, a considerable proportion of state money circulates as commercial 
banknotes, which will appear as either assets or reserves on commercial bank balance sheets. 
Conversely, there is a certain amount of commercial bank money that circulates and is 
converted into fiat money as private economic agents, depending upon their liquidity 
preferences, choose to hold a proportion of these banknotes as cash. The extent to which 
commercial debts are regulated is determined by the central bank, which regulates the 
creation of liquidity. In the final analysis, credit-money cannot exist without the state and all 
credit-money is necessarily state money regardless of its form of circulation as either 
commercial credit or as central bank liabilities. 
 
THE THEORY OF LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE 
 
Central to the Keynesian vision is the role performed by uncertainty. The concept of liquidity 
preference means that, unlike simple barter, sales and purchases need no longer coincide. As 
soon as the critical element of time is introduced, the possibility arises that economic agents 
have a propensity to hoard; the seller is not obliged to buy as soon as selling. Money 
therefore not only acts as a means of circulation but also as a store of value. The essential 
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and ineluctable problem of uncertainty implies that there is a profound nexus between time 
and money: ‘For the importance of money essentially flows from its being a link between the 
present and the future’ (Keynes, 1936, pp.293-94). As soon as money is construed as a store 
of value, the whole logic of Say’s law breaks down: ‘To assert that money matters in a world 
of complete predictability is to be logically inconsistent, for money’s special properties as a 
store of wealth, is due to its ability to postpone the undertaking of rigid and far-reaching 
resource commitments. Money only matters in a world of uncertainty’ (Davidson, 1972, 
p.16). The nexus between money and uncertainty is therefore quite seminal in the Keynesian 
view of a modern economy in the sense that investment is dependent upon future 
expectations on the expected rate of return. The fact that private investment decisions are 
based upon uncertainty suggests that investment itself is volatile and explains, to a certain 
extent, the reason why capitalist economies are inherently unstable. Uncertainty in the 
original Keynesian conception is radically different from the neoclassical notions of 
calculable and probabilistic risk: 
 
By uncertain knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is 
known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in 
this sense, to uncertainty; nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, 
again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only 
moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the 
prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest 
twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private 
wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific 
basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know 
(Keynes, 1937b, p.114). 
 
In the General Theory, liquidity preferences tend to inform real expenditure choices over 
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time. Money plays a unique role in relation to the existence of future contracts, which are 
normally denominated in nominal terms. These forward contracts are subject to uncertainty. 
It follows that the ability to meet these contractual obligations, the possession of money or 
other highly liquid assets are essential in the face of future uncertainty. These liquid assets 
also perform the function of a store of wealth or as a safe haven during periods of heightened 
uncertainty (Davidson, 1996, p 63). Money becomes a crucial link between the irreversible 
past and the unknown future; it acts as a ‘time machine’: ‘The possession of actual money 
lulls our disquietude; and the premium which we require to make us part with money is the 
measure of the degree of our disquietude’ (Keynes, 1937b, p.116).  
 
In this perspective, money as a store of value depresses effective demand and delays the 
activation of idle resources. This only creates further uncertainty and postpones potential 
demand for goods and services. Entrepreneurs encounter problems in relation to their 
respective formation of future expectations and the timing of their investment expenditure 
(Fontana, 2000, p.32). Keynes argues that the existence of uncertainty is an essential 
condition for the function of money to act as a store of wealth: ‘The interest rate is the 
premium which has to be offered to induce people to hold wealth in some form other than 
hoarded money’ (Keynes, 1937b, p.116). Under the conditions of unutilised excess capacity 
and rising unemployment, the state of uncertainty merely postpones planned investment and 
influences the expectations of wealth holders to hold their assets in a more liquid form 
(Dillard, 1962, p.22). The excessive demand for liquidity will tend to divert real resources 
from being employed in the sphere of productive investment and leads inevitably to the 
existence of involuntary unemployment.  
 
Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti-social than the fetish of 
liquidity, the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the part of investment institutions to 
concentrate their resources upon the holding of ‘liquid’ securities. It forgets that there 
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is no such thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a whole. The social 
object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance, 
which envelop our future. The actual, private object of most skilled investment today 
is ‘to beat the gun’, as the Americans so well express it, to outwit the crowd, and to 
pass the bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the other fellow (Keynes, 1936, p.155). 
 
Whereas the transactions and precautionary motives relate to money as a means of payments, 
the speculative motive embodies the role of money as a store of wealth. The critical 
significance of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preferences was that it had rejected the 
neoclassical view of the ex-ante identity between saving and investment, which had 
reinstated Say’s law. Quite simply, the role of money as a store of value could not possibly 
exist in the absence of uncertainty. In an ergodic world of calculable risk and certainty (or 
rational expectations), the motive for holding money as a store of wealth would cease to 
exist: ‘But in the world of the classical economy, what an insane use to which to put it! For it 
is a recognised characteristic of money as a store of wealth that it is barren; whereas 
practically every other form of storing wealth yields some interest or profit. Why should 
anyone outside a lunatic asylum wish to use money as a store of wealth?’ (Keynes, 1937b, 
p.116). Yet the role performed by uncertainty in the radical Keynesian conception, has been 
ruled out by neoclassical assumptions.  
 
Keynes developed a theory of liquidity preference based upon the types of money required to 
satisfy subjective motives in a world governed by future uncertainty. The transactions and 
precautionary motives would necessarily correspond with the preference for cash deposits or 
highly liquid assets. The speculative motive, on the other hand, would govern the short-term 
money markets and the bond markets. While the precautionary and transactions motives are 
closely linked to the level of income and expenditure, the speculative motive, on the other 
hand, is associated with the level of wealth and the relative returns on investment and the 
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rate of interest respectively (Sawyer, 2003, p.8). In the absence of uncertainty, these motives 
would be meaningless and money itself would cease to provide a means by which to form 
expectations about the future. The formation of liquidity preferences are thus inextricably 
connected to the notion of uncertainty. Money provides liquidity and acts as a store of value 
or a perceived safe haven during periods of radical uncertainty. This conception stands in 
stark contrast to the notion of probabilistic and calculable risk. 
 
Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the 
characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend 
on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or 
hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the 
full consequences of which will be drawn out over many years to come, can only be 
taken as a result of animal spirits – of a spontaneous urge to action rather than 
inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits 
multiplied by quantitative probabilities (Keynes, 1936, p.161). 
 
In the original Keynesian schema of the General Theory, liquidity preferences reflect 
portfolio choices, which are influenced by an exogenously determined stock of money 
supplied by the central bank. The rate of interest is therefore a function of monetary policy, 
even though the demand for money is also an endogenous process of private credit-creation. 
Money as a store of wealth implies a stock demand for money based upon liquidity 
preferences by wealth-holders. The money supply can be influenced by either the exogenous 
instruments of central banks (open market operations) or through the endogenous expansion 
and contraction of private bank money. Keynes argues that the peculiar nature of a monetary 
economy is that liquidity preferences tend to fluctuate on the basis of subjective valuations 
of future rates of return on investment. Thus, an increased demand for money for either 
precautionary or speculative motives might be at the expense of planned investment, which 
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will ultimately have a detrimental effect on the level of employment. The paradox of thrift 
suggests that the economy could be operating at an equilibrium level of output which does 
not necessarily correspond with full employment. 
 
This is the idea of the paradox of thrift: investment determines saving so that given 
low investment by firms when households are excessively thrifty, income falls until 
the aggregate of saving decisions (as determined by the marginal propensity to save) is 
consistent with the aggregate of investment decisions. Alternatively, aggregate saving 
cannot be increased by trying to have more, but only by investing more – which raises 
income and thus saving (Wray, 1998, p.82). 
 
Under these circumstances, an increased preference to hold money might induce a failure to 
meet future financial commitments. As defaults escalate, there emerges a chain reaction 
because the banks and other financial institutions will be unable to meet their commitments. 
Indeed, since deposits represent liabilities from the standpoint of the banks, the opposite 
applies to depositors who consider these deposits as assets. Hence, an increase in liquidity 
preferences implies an automatic curtailment of the ability of both lenders and borrowers to 
fulfil their future contractual obligations. These cascading defaults and bankruptcies could 
lead inexorably to a severe phase of debt-deflation (Kregel, 2008, p. 134). 
 
In a monetary economy of production, money (or credit money) must always be endogenous; 
its quantity is determined by debt contracts denominated in a unit of account. Keynes’s 
transactions motive is further divided into an ‘income’ motive and an ‘investment’ motive. 
In the General Theory, Keynes had ignored the endogeneity of credit money to concentrate 
on the liquidity preference theory of the rate of interest. However, in the post-General 
Theory articles in a debate with Ohlin, Hawtrey and Robertson in the Economic Journal in 
1937/38, Keynes introduces what became known as the ‘finance motive’. The finance 
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motive related to the demand by firms for external finance by the commercial banks (Hein, 
2008, p.35). As the rate of investment increases, there is a corresponding increase in the 
demand for external finance (Keynes, 1938). As long as banks continue to be profitable by 
increasing their assets and liabilities and as long as only a small proportion of defaults are 
incurred, the banking system itself will experience a shift in its initial liquidity position 
(Asimakopulos, 1986, p.86-87). 
 
Planned investment – i.e. investment ex-ante – may have to secure its ‘financial 
provision’ before the investment takes place; that is to say, before the corresponding 
saving has taken place….This service may be provided either by the new issue market 
or by the banks; – which it is, makes no difference.(Keynes, 1937, p.246). 
 
Ohlin’s, Robertson’s and Hawtrey’s (1937) critiques focused upon Keynes’s argument that 
the transactions demand for money depends on current output per se. The issue of financing 
ex-ante investment remains unresolved in the General Theory. This critique and the 
subsequent debates over the liquidity preference theory, persuaded Keynes to modify and 
clarify his original position by introducing the ‘finance’ motive (Bibow, 1995, p.650). In 
order to provide the extra finance, Keynes develops a ‘revolving fund’ theory of investment 
finance: 
 
If investment is proceeding at a steady state, the finance (or the commitments to 
finance) required can be supplied from a revolving fund of a more or less constant 
amount, one entrepreneur having his finance replenished for the purpose of a projected 
investment as another exhausts his on paying for his completed investment. But if 
decisions to invest are (e.g.) increasing, the extra finance involved will constitute an 
additional demand for money….But ‘finance’ and ‘commitments to finance’ are mere 
credit and debit book entries, which allow entrepreneurs to go ahead with 
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assurance….Credit, in the sense of ‘finance’ looks after a flow of investment. It is a 
revolving fund which can be used over and over again. It does not absorb or exhaust 
any resources (Keynes, 1937, p.247). 
 
A sequential process is thus set in train as the initial expansion of credit is compensated by 
the destruction of credit money via the revolving fund of finance. According to 
Asimakopulos (1986), the initial investment finance can only be available after the full 
multiplier effect is realised. Hence, there is a time lag involved: the increase in desired 
saving does not necessarily arise simultaneously with the new investment expenditure, even 
though ex post investment and ex post saving are, by definition, always equal. 
 
Keynes's theory of the rate of interest in the General Theory was formulated as a liquidity 
preference theory of interest. This view contrasted with Keynes's earlier, more orthodox 
treatment in the Treatise in which the rate of interest is determined by saving and 
investment. The neoclassical chain of causation is reversed in the General Theory in which 
expenditure decisions govern aggregate demand and thus provide the primary determinant in 
the level of output. Investment decisions represent a prior claim on output since business 
expenditure determines the share of profits. It follows that business profits should always be 
sufficient to provide the residual amount of saving required to finance investment: ‘To state 
the matter in a different way: profits ex post will always be sufficient to generate residual 
savings which means that ex post saving will equal ex post investment’ (Kaldor, 1985, p.34). 
In the General Theory, Keynes's argument was that the rate of interest was not a reward for 
saving or abstinence from consumption because the propensity to save was determined by 
the level of income and thus by investment expenditure. Indeed, under circumstances in 
which effective demand is depressed and with the onset of a deflationary spiral, the paradox 
of thrift is characterised by a liquidity trap. An expansionary monetary policy under these 
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extreme conditions is doubtless quite ineffectual. 2
 
 
Consequently, the demand for money influences the rate of interest on bonds and sets the 
upper limit to the bond yield. Liquidity preference permits the rate of interest to be 
determined by the supply and demand for a given quantity of money. The market rate of 
interest, however, does not necessarily correspond with the equality between saving and 
investment at full employment equilibrium (Sawyer, 2005, p.101). Planned investment (i.e., 
investment ex ante) might not be sufficient to ensure full employment. It can be surmised 
that in the General Theory, Keynes argued that interest rates are a monetary phenomena 
determined by the theory of liquidity preference. The direction of causation runs from 
investment to saving. However, the analysis in the General Theory continues to assume a 
fixed quantity of money and the tentative treatment of endogenous money from a chartalist 
standpoint, which was suggestive in the Treatise, appears to have been neglected (Smithin, 
2003). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In a world governed by radical uncertainty, a monetary economy is doubtless characterised 
by destabilising waves of optimism and pessimism as investors and speculators are driven by 
fluctuating liquidity preferences in a self-reinforcing herd-like behaviour. Financial markets 
are by their very nature volatile and unpredictable if left to their own devices. Keynes’s 
original critique of the ‘classical’ economists during his own era has been entirely ignored 
and superseded by the recent ascendancy of rational expectations and efficient markets 
hypotheses. It appears that economic theory has gone full circle: the classical postulates, 
                                                 
2 The Japanese experience of chronic stagnation in the 1990s provides the most recent exemplar of 
this cumulative process characterised by a deflationary trap. 
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which had informed Say’s law and which the Keynesian revolution sought to overthrow, 
have simply been reinstated, albeit in the guise of more sophisticated mathematical models. 
Ultimately, the problem of uncertainty, which was central to the Keynesian vision of a 
modern, monetary economy, has been subsumed and relegated to the status of calculable, 
probabilistic notions of risk in the prevailing economic discourse. Keynes’s own words 
perhaps best capture this neoclassical fallacy: ‘The calculus of probability, though mention 
of it was kept in the background, was supposed to be capable of reducing uncertainty to the 
same calculable status as that of certainty itself; just as in the Benthamite calculus of pains 
and pleasures or of advantage and disadvantage, by which the Benthamite philosophy 
assumed men to be influenced in their general ethical behaviour’ (Keynes, 1937b, p.113). 
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